Book Review | Geopolitical Union: Europe’s Attempt to Take Back Control of Technology Regulation

Geopolitical Union: Europe’s Attempt to Take Back Control of Technology Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2026) is a timely and theoretically ambitious analysis of the European Union’s maturing technology governance. It is authored by Benjamin Farrand and contains brilliant analysis of EU’s evolution from a passive regulator into what Farrand calls the “geopolitical commission”. It is the powerful idea that the EU has entered into “regulatory mercantilism”, a model that mixes economic statecraft, security considerations and assertive industrial policy to assert control over key technologies in the face of increasing geopolitical tensions.

Farrand sees regulatory mercantilism as a reaction to weaknesses – a lack of control over supply chains, domination by ‘Big Tech’ and the decline of the liberal international order. Comparing the historic mercantilist emphasis on “power and plenty”, he argues that “the EU now considers economic prosperity and security to be mutually reinforcing.”

In contrast to a light-touch approach to self-regulation or market-driven governance (regulatory capitalism), the Commission is increasingly adopting the use of binding rules, co-regulation, industrial policy and the “Brussels Effect” to mitigate external dependency and to export European norms in the field of data, AI, cybersecurity and platforms. The concepts of ‘digital/technological sovereignty’ and ‘strategic autonomy’ are rhetorical and policy motivators of this change.

The book consists of three sections. The introduction and part I lay the theoretical and historical groundwork. Thematic analysis, informed by grounded theory, and a context-process-outcome framework provide a tool through which Farrand maps the path of the EU from Eurosclerosis to the ‘polycrisis’ of the 2010s and the present geopolitical turn. Chapter 3 puts this in a larger context – the end of the post-Cold War liberal order, the technological competition between the United States and China and other events such as the chip shortage and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The empirical substance of the book is provided in part II via three case studies. The concept of “technological systems” is discussed in Chapter 4, comprising standards, cybersecurity rules and semiconductor policy. The platform regulation (content moderation, disinformation, Digital Services Act) and the governance of data/AI (GDPR’s development, Common European Data Spaces, AI Act) are covered in Chapters 5 and 6. Part III and the conclusion evaluate the von der Leyen era and the reactions to President Donald Trump’s re-election, the competitiveness compass and defence-tech integration and the framework’s wider relevance.

Farrand’s most important idea is the notion of ‘regulatory mercantilism’ that allows readers to delve into the EU’s transformation into a hierarchy in the public-private relationship and the securitisation of economic policy. The analysis is well documented, with more than 120 Commission documents, speeches and academic sources. This book is especially good in connecting rhetoric (sovereignty and autonomy) with policy realities and is therefore very useful for scholars in the field of EU studies, international political economy and digital policy.

While EU approach is still fragmented across the member states, the book could have done more to critically engage with implementation challenges or possible over-reach (e.g. implementation costs of innovation, enforcement gaps). The EU’s ongoing multilateral and values based aspirations may also be a subject of some debate amongst some readers as to whether “mercantilism” is an accurate term.

To conclude, Geopolitical Union is an essential reading for anyone who wants to grasp the quest for technological relevance by an increasingly fragmented Europe. In a convincing argument, Farrand demonstrates that the EU is no longer a naïve norm entrepreneur, but rather a strategic actor that strives for regulatory sovereignty. The book is around 200 pages long and is quite readable. It will be of interest to policymakers, academics and anyone concerned with the future of global tech governance.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.