Why India Should Engage With Somaliland: An Economic and Security Perspective

Summary

As global maritime trade and energy transit routes face significant security challenges, driven by the rising geopolitical tensions, the ongoing Middle East escalations, and the continuous attacks on commercial vessels along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, these maritime disruptions result in serious economic shockwaves. Consequently, a growing security imperative is pushing India to reassess its engagement with Somaliland to advance its economic and security ambitions in Africa and the Western Indian Ocean region; however, considerable geopolitical challenges exist, necessitating careful navigation by India.

Considered one of the most vital regions in the world, the Horn of Africa is located at a strategic maritime crossroads that connects the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean. The region has emerged as the central flashpoint for regional geopolitical alliances and great power competition, particularly between the U.S. and China—both have military bases and maintain economic investments. Following this context, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden constitute vital maritime shipping corridors in which 30 per cent of the world’s global container traffic and 12 per cent of the world’s energy pass through these routes.

Given these dynamics, Somaliland emerged as strategically important to these maritime corridors. DP World’s investment in the Berbera Port under the concession agreement between Somaliland and the UAE in 2016 marked a turning point for Somaliland’s strategic significance; subsequently, the port gained international attention and has attracted many countries, such as the U.S. and its allies, particularly Israel, which became the first country to recognise Somaliland as an independent state on 26 December 2025. Moreover, Taiwan’s economic and security interests in the port emerged in recent years. In this regard, the port’s expansion phases, special economic zone, and the advanced airport in Berbera have transformed Somaliland from a largely overlooked country into an emerging strategic gateway connecting Africa to major global shipping routes.

Connecting this to India’s strategic ambitions in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean to improve its African trade and economic relations and to safeguard Indian commercial shipments passing through these maritime routes, Somaliland emerges as a relevant partner for engagement. India is Africa’s third-largest trading partner, and this relationship depends on maritime-related trade and energy imports. At the same time, Indian ships face attacks by the Houthis in the Gulf of Aden. Historically, India and the Horn of Africa have maintained historic relations, and India has participated in nearly all United Nations peacekeeping missions, including anti-piracy operations and maritime security interventions. However, India and Somaliland have not maintained any prior diplomatic and security relations. Reports indicate that India’s interest in Somaliland lies in minerals and gold resources in its eastern regions. Yet this diplomatic silence, the strategic location of Somaliland, and India’s evolving strategic maritime security and economic objectives in the Horn of Africa are now pushing India to look back at Somaliland. Accordingly, India’s maritime vision under the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) emphasises maritime security and established connectivity throughout the Indian region. Similarly, India’s Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor framework (IMEC) is also relevant to India’s engagement in the UAE-Somaliland axes. The IMEC seeks to strengthen economic and trade links between India, the Gulf region, and Europe. This economic and trade framework could be operationalised in India’s utilisation of the Port of Berbera. This can contribute to India’s economic and trade connectivity to Africa and the Middle East.

The rationale behind the strategy of India’s relations with Somaliland is more than the connection itself. The Horn of Africa region is going through a process of new geopolitical alignments that are transforming the security and economic realities of the region. Moving in line with this realignment, there are two prominent geopolitical alliances within the region: the first is the alliance of U.S. partners, which includes the UAE, Somaliland, Israel, Taiwan, and Ethiopia with common geopolitical and security interests; however, there are differences. The second is China’s allies, which are mostly authoritarian regimes that include Djibouti, Somalia, Turkey, Egypt, Eritrea, and Saudi Arabia. India is nearer to the alliance of Somaliland for its Israeli and U.S. relations.

In a similar way, Somaliland maintains strong relations with Ethiopia—Africa’s most populous landlocked country and one of the fastest-growing East African economies. Concurrently, India and Ethiopia have traditionally sustained relations for more than decades. Somaliland’s main partner in the region is Ethiopia, due to security and economic ties, trade corridors, and their shared border. The Port of Berbera is seen by Ethiopia as an important alternative route to Djibouti, which it has relied on for almost all its sea transportation over time.

For India, which views Ethiopia as its most regional trade and economic ally, Somaliland will be the route that connects India’s trade to Ethiopia and also where India can counter shipping attacks and piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. In relation to India’s push to expand its economic growth ambitions for the continent to reach more than USD100 billion annually, Ethiopia is a suitable partner for India to achieve its trade and economic goals for Africa, where Somaliland is the actual candidate that connects India through such strategic East African markets.

In addition to this, the recent Houthi attacks on the commercial vessels mean that India faces significant economic losses regarding these maritime assets, resulting in India deploying at least a dozen warships, including a surveillance aircraft, to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to secure its maritime shipping and prevent such attacks. Against this backdrop, as the Indian Navy does not match the capabilities of the U.S. and China, reaching out to partners and building alliances will be a strategic gain for the future. Somaliland’s geostrategic position in the Gulf of Aden, located near the Bab el Mandeb Strait, provides India with strategic opportunities for maritime security and trade connectivity in the region.

This article argues that there are growing economic and security determinants pushing India to reconsider its Horn of Africa policy, particularly in the case of Somaliland, to establish formal diplomatic and security cooperation. However, complex traditional challenges are risking these relations. India’s engagement with Somaliland can open doors for regional trade and economic connectivity, with Ethiopia becoming its biggest economic and trade partner. At the same time, Somaliland remains the logical strategic corridor that bridges India to East African markets through the Berbera Port. Such strategic relations can enable India to develop a net security framework that counters maritime insecurity, piracy activities, and authoritarian expansionism along these strategic chokepoints.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.