The Statecraft Institute
Commentary

Armenia and Azerbaijan at the Crossroads between Iran and Turkey: The Geopolitics of Regional Connectivity

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The regional status quo in the South Caucasus has shifted since the 2020 Karabakh war. In this context, Iran and Turkey have sought to expand their political and economic influence in the region.

From an Iranian perspective, the Rasht–Astara railway, which connects the existing railway networks of Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan, should be viewed in the context of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). The railway has gained importance for Iran following its cooperation agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Armenia is the only EAEU member state that shares a land border with Iran. In 2023, Iranian companies signed contracts to construct the 32-km Kajaran–Agarak section of Armenia’s North–South Road Corridor.

The route that runs from India to Russia and connects to both Northern and Western Europe passes through Azerbaijan. Thus, Azerbaijan’s importance as part of this transport link should be emphasised. In this regard, Turkey has supported the regional ambitions of its ally, Azerbaijan. Such a transport link would exclude Armenia, thereby diminishing the country’s regional significance. However, Iran’s projects include the construction of roads through Armenia, which would establish reliable connections between Iran and Georgia’s Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi. Therefore, a transport link connecting Georgia, Armenia, and Iran could be established.

On the other hand, the Trans-Caspian East–West–Middle Corridor, also referred to by Ankara as the “Middle Corridor,” is viewed by Iran as a significant threat. Running through Georgia and Azerbaijan, the route connects Turkey to the Caucasus, while a maritime link across the Caspian Sea extends connectivity to China and Central Asia. If a route connecting Central Asia to the Black and Mediterranean seas is developed, Iran risks being excluded from a potentially significant regional transit network.

In 2016, Iran proposed a regional plan to extend the Persian Gulf–Black Sea International Transport and Transit Corridor, which encompasses Georgia, Bulgaria, Greece, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This multimodal route would connect southern Iran with Armenia and/or Azerbaijan and Georgia’s Black Sea ports. However, Azerbaijan has shown limited interest in the project, as reflected in its limited engagement in the negotiation process. This may be attributable to Azerbaijan’s active cooperation with Turkey on regional projects and its reluctance to pursue economic cooperation with Armenia because of the Karabakh conflict. Through this initiative, Iran aims to become a regional transport hub and establish a corridor to Europe. The corridor would connect four important maritime basins: (1) the Caspian Sea (Iran and Azerbaijan); (2) the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman (Iran); (3) the Black Sea (Georgia and Bulgaria); and (4) the Mediterranean Sea (Greece). This prospect could increase Armenia’s regional significance.

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has emerged as one of Turkey’s main gas suppliers, meeting approximately 16 per cent of Turkey’s demand in 2022. Azerbaijan and Turkey have agreed to construct a long-planned gas pipeline connecting Turkey’s gas network to Nakhichevan. It is being built under a memorandum of understanding signed by Azerbaijan and Turkey in December 2020. The Nakhichevan gas pipeline agreement plans to increase bilateral trade beyond $4 billion – signalling a shift in the regional balance of power. By strengthening its relations with the Turkic republics, Turkey has made significant progress towards becoming a dominant force in the Caucasus.

In all, the regional transport initiatives offer Armenia and Azerbaijan opportunities to strengthen their economic positions and regional significance. These initiatives serve as instruments through which Iran and Turkey seek to expand their political and economic influence in the South Caucasus. Such competing connectivity projects create different opportunities and constraints for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, owing to its close political and ideological ties with Turkey, as well as anticipated economic benefits, is more inclined to align its regional connectivity projects with Ankara. Meanwhile, Armenia has strengthened its economic cooperation with Iran. Thus, the development of transport and energy infrastructure is not only an economic process but also a reflection of the evolving geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus, with implications for the regional positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.