Bunker Down, Hunker Down – The Dead Hand Returns

Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and other principals in his administration have warned the United States and its NATO allies about the possibility of a Kremlin decision for nuclear first use. Some have dismissed this as empty rhetoric to distract the Russian public and others from the embarrassment of a four-year deadlock between Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. On the other hand, among nuclear weapons states, Russia has the largest number of so-called nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons (NSNW) deployed and-or available for prompt use if need be. A possible nuclear first use by Russia in what its leaders define as exigent circumstances, including threats to the survival of the state and regime, cannot be dismissed from consideration by policy makers and military planners.

Russia’s seriousness about the possible crossing of the nuclear threshold is also underscored by its awareness that a tactical nuclear war might escalate into a strategic nuclear exchange with more dire consequences. This recognition by Russian leadership has led to an extensive effort to provide for the survivability and endurance of its nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) systems. Reportedly, Russia has rebooted its Cold War era Perimeter system (denoted Dead Hand by Western observers) by constructing a structurally enhanced command and control doomsday bunker in a remote part of the Ural Mountains. Designated as Facility 335, the new command and communications systems would, in the event of a nuclear attack against Russia, provide for secure radio transmissions to mobile missile launchers. Once launched, the mobile launchers could transmit encrypted orders to surviving missile launch silos or possibly other components of the Russian strategic nuclear triad. ¹

The most immediate concern of Russian political and military leaders in the event of nuclear attacks is their own survival and that of their control over remaining military assets and political power. Putin is reportedly almost paranoid about the possibility of a decapitation strike that would take out Russia’s highest ranking political and military leaders. In a meeting with senior military officials in 2020, the Russian President discussed the creation of a nuclear command and control system that would survive any attack. According to Putin: “They (military officials) have told me that the creation of an absolutely security facility for controlling strategic nuclear forces, among others, is nearing completion, and that it will have a very high safety margin.”² Russian nuclear strategy and policy expert Pavel Podvig has noted: “Perimeter is actually a communication system. If you are struck, you need to make sure you can transmit the order for retaliatory action.”³

Does the possibility of a more shock resistant Russian nuclear command and control system make us feel better, or worse, about the crisis stability and arms race as between the United States (together with allied NATO countries) and Russia? On one hand, if the Russians have relatively more confidence than hitherto in their NC3 survivability, their leaders might be less inclined to opt for preemption in the midst of a serious crisis. An expectation of survivable and enduring communications and control would also support a willingness to hold back on the most provocative military maneuvers during a confrontation. Each side’s forces might raise their alert levels but not to the highest possible condition of launch readiness, and each might take steps to reassure the other side that this was the case. For example, bomber overflights might be limited to missions flying near to one another’s borders but not actually crossing into their territorial airspace. Communications between political leaders over digitally updated Hot Lines, compared to the Cold War standard, could expedite the deescalation of a crisis and calm the frayed nerves of political leaders and military planners.

On the other hand, if we step back from the narrow viewpoint of nuclear deterrence and crisis management, and consider the Russian doomsday bunker from a more inclusive perspective, matters become more complicated. Is this entire investment in bunker biliousness, and are comparable “improvements” in nuclear command and control by the United States and its allies, symptoms of a failure in imagination and a corrosion of values? What, after all, is the point of survivable and enduring nuclear command and control in the event that deterrence actually fails and a large scale nuclear war ensues? Russian military leaders may be reassured that their upscale Dead Hand system will provide for revenge, but nonetheless, the mass destruction from a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia will ensure the end of civilization as we know it. A poisoned atmosphere of “nuclear winter” will obliterate food crops worldwide, water will be contaminated, medical services will be nearly nonexistent, and those who are not included among “prompt fatalities” will be marked for later and inevitable death.

What is also unclear about the fidelity of strategic nuclear command and control in Russia, or in other nuclear weapons states, is how dependent it will become on artificial intelligence (AI). AI-embedded decision-making systems will find their way into virtually all corners of the business and government worlds during the next decade. Nuclear powers will be tempted to turn to AI for assistance in organising data, generating options, and prioritising decisions with respect to crisis management, command and control. The temptation to fully automate decisions with respect to nuclear first use or first strike must be resisted, even if a crisis seems about to slip out of control and ambiguities about the intentions of others confound decision making. The fog of war (or decisions related to crossing the nuclear threshold) must be met not only with smarter silicon, but also with the understanding that, in the case of nuclear war, second chances may not be on offer.

Instead of open-ended funding for revenge bunkers, Russia should engage the United States once again in nuclear arms control talks of the kind that produced the New START agreement. The United States and Russia owe it to themselves to walk away from endless nuclear potlatch and to make efforts to include China, an emerging third nuclear superpower, in their deliberations. This goal should be practicable. On the evidence, Chinese strategic planning seems to emphasise precision conventional missiles, cyberwar and counterspace weapons – all included in a stew of strategic deception and AI.⁴ In the meantime, both the U.S. and Russia should expedite negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The longer this war continues and expands in destructiveness, the greater the risk that inadvertent or deliberate escalation to nuclear first use, or worse, will result. Bunker mentalities butter no parsnips.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.