Europe as a Relational Foreign Policy Actor

The European Union (EU) confronts an increasingly hostile international environment. Great-power competition, regional conflicts and internal political divisions all constrain its ability to act as a conventional geopolitical power. Compared with states such as the United States, China or Russia, the EU possesses limited military capabilities, fragmented decision-making structures and only indirect leverage over many international crises. Yet these limitations have not rendered European foreign and security policy entirely ineffective. Instead, they have encouraged the Union and its member states to develop a distinctive mode of action based on relationships, partnerships and institutional flexibility.

The defining characteristic of EU foreign and security policy is therefore its relational nature. The Union operates through a dense network of member states, common institutions, international organisations and external partners, while combining diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and security instruments governed by different procedures. This multi-dimensional structure undoubtedly complicates policymaking, but it also provides strategic opportunities unavailable to national governments.

The first adaptive strategy is coalition-building. Faced with growing multipolar competition and modest military capabilities, the EU has consistently sought to augment its influence by embedding itself within broader multilateral frameworks. The response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine illustrates this approach. European support for Kyiv relied not only on EU institutions but also on NATO, bilateral EU-US consultations on sanctions, and G7 cooperation on measures such as freezing Russian sovereign assets and imposing an oil price cap. These overlapping partnerships significantly expanded Europe’s ability to sustain pressure on Moscow and support Ukraine, even after the United States reduced its engagement under the second Trump administration.

A second strategy is selective and pragmatic engagement. Many contemporary conflicts generate interconnected political, humanitarian, security and migration challenges that exceed the EU’s capacity to address them comprehensively. The Union thus often focuses on areas where it can realistically make a difference. The negotiations leading to the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement provide a clear example. European diplomacy deliberately compartmentalised the nuclear issue from broader disagreements over Iran’s regional policies, allowing France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the EU High Representative to facilitate an agreement that significantly reduced proliferation risks. The eventual collapse of the deal following the US withdrawal did not invalidate the European approach; rather, it demonstrated both its potential and its dependence on external political conditions.

This selective pragmatism characterises EU engagement elsewhere as well. Capacity-building partnerships in Southeast Asia, humanitarian assistance combined with election monitoring in Venezuela, or institutional support for the Palestinian Authority all reflect a willingness to focus on limited but achievable objectives rather than pursue comprehensive political transformation. Such policies often produce only partial or temporary results, or no result at all; yet they allow the Union to remain engaged in conflicts where stronger geopolitical actors dominate the political and military dimensions.

A third mechanism through which the EU overcomes its limitations concerns the management of internal divisions. Foreign policy unanimity frequently constrains collective action, as national governments must reconcile European objectives with sensitive domestic political considerations. Yet even when consensus proves difficult, the Union has developed institutional mechanisms that allow cooperation to continue. One solution is delegation to common institutions, enabling member states to support European initiatives while distancing themselves politically from controversial decisions. The EU’s role in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue illustrates this dynamic: governments unwilling formally to recognise Kosovo have nevertheless accepted an active European mediation role. In other cases, smaller groups of member states assume leadership on behalf of the Union, allowing progress without requiring complete political uniformity.

These adaptive strategies reveal an important feature of European foreign policy. The EU exercises influence by connecting actors, coordinating policies and mobilising complementary capabilities across multiple institutional levels. Its strength lies in combining supranational institutions with intergovernmental cooperation, linking internal and external policies, and integrating diplomatic, economic and regulatory instruments into coherent responses. This relational capacity enables the Union to remain relevant even in crisis contexts, even if to a limited extent only.

Relational power should not be romanticised. European influence remains highly contingent on the willingness of partners to cooperate and on international conditions beyond the Union’s control. Even its greatest diplomatic successes can prove temporary, as demonstrated by the fate of the Iran nuclear agreement. Nevertheless, the EU’s relational approach reflects the Union’s unique institutional character as a hybrid supranational and intergovernmental actor. More than any individual state, the EU derives influence from its capacity to build partnerships, sustain dialogue, coordinate diverse policy instruments and maintain collective action despite internal disagreements. In an increasingly fragmented international order, these relational capabilities constitute a way of managing Europe’s limitations as well as a distinctive comparative advantage.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.