Russian Statecraft and New Wave Mobilisation?

Introduction

Russia launched its full-scale conventional war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 along multiple axes, deploying contract soldiers who signed individual indefinite deals in return for large cash bonuses. Russia’s contract-recruitment campaign is based on quotas set for regional governors, equivalent to 0.3 per cent of their population each year.

In September 2022, following dramatic and unexpected battlefield retreats, Putin announced a partial mobilisation of 284,000 reservists. The enabling laws and decrees adopted remain in force. Russia has 670,000 men in the field, with another 65,000 in operational reserve and the overall size of Russian forces fighting Ukraine has not changed significantly over the past year.

Russian officials, not least the Chairman of the State Duma’s Defence Committee, Andrei Kartapolov, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, and Russia’s UN permanent representative Vasily Nebenzya, openly and consistently deny that a new wave of mobilisation will follow the State Duma elections ending on 20 September 2026. President Vladimir Putin described Western media reports of mobilisation as “utter nonsense. It’s an information attack against Russia.”

What might this related decision-making tell us about Russian statecraft in 2026? What does it tell us about the ability of Putin’s regime to align its ways (capabilities) and means (resources) to achieve its strategic ends – victory over Ukraine?

Why Mobilise: Putin’s Risk Calculus?

The war is in its fifth year and is stalemated. Russia currently loses more men through attrition than it recruits. In July 2026, approximately 30,000 Russian soldiers were killed or seriously wounded, with only 27,000 recruited. In the first seven months of 2026, 221,000 joined the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces, while casualties amounted to nearly 225,500 (131,000 killed, almost 93,000 wounded).

The only way for Russia to achieve even the limited Russian strategic objective of capturing Donbas would be to mobilise between 200,000 and 1.2 million men to replenish reserves and create a new force grouping capable of initiating a new Russian offensive. Alternatively, Russia could halt existing axes and redeploy troops to the Donbas front.

At its starkest, Putin’s choice can be framed as binary: accept military defeat or undertake unpopular mobilisation that sparks domestic protest and ruins Russia’s economy. However, Russian society views the existing voluntary contract system as legitimate: servicemen are fairly compensated in a market transaction freely entered without undue coercion. More realistically, the choice is between taking two more years to capture Donbas or risking the impact of full mobilisation on the Russian military itself: how to find officers to form and train new units, and the resources to equip them, let alone support elements for new brigades, divisions, and armies?

To avoid general mobilisation, Russia now stress-tests the limits of such tolerance by quietly undertaking covert partial and peripheral mobilisation to widen the recruitment pool. Regional quotas and/or regional sign-up bonuses can be increased. Laws can change the age at which former soldiers stop counting as reservists; the conscription age limit can be increased from 27 to 30; and criminal liability for evading mobilisation could be introduced. Russia can mobilise more men from Ukraine’s occupied territories, target expelled university students for conscription and introduce 2 per cent university quotas and incentives around deployment to the rear for one year as drone operators. Penal colonies and press gangs are also recruitment options currently pursued. Convicts serve as contract soldiers in penal battalions in return for criminal amnesty, an avenue of recruitment begun by Wagner PMC in the summer of 2022. Since spring 2026, reports of men being detained and then pushed into signing contracts have increased.

Moving beyond indigenous sources, Russia can look externally to widen the pool. North Korea could deploy between 30,000 and 50,000 troops to backfill for Russian troops sent to the front. Foreign mercenaries from states such as Bangladesh, Burundi and Sudan constitute approximately 20,000 of Russia’s 700,000 deployed to Ukraine. Some foreign nationals are lured to Russia by fake job advertisements and forced to sign contracts to fight in Ukraine - a tiny fraction of the overall number.

Putin’s Predictive Thinking

Full mobilisation represents Putin’s last “or-or-nothing” throw of the escalation dice, entailing either “victory” by spring 2027 or a “ceasefire” on Ukraine’s terms. Soft hidden peripheral mobilisation aligns better with Putin’s theory of Russian victory, cautious statecraft and three underlying beliefs: Europe is disintegrating and an unpredictable President Trump will be distracted by the November mid-term US elections; Ukrainian energy infrastructure can be destroyed over winter and ballistic missile terror attacks on civilians break resistance; and, the 110 “veterans” running for the State Duma will create a militarised pro-war political constituency willing to legitimise continued military expenditure, future escalation and prolongation of the war. Putin believes over time Russia can still deploy resources and build capabilities to achieve its goals.

This commentary reflects the views of the author and does not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the United States, Germany, or any other government.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.