Russia’s Asian Welcome

For more than a century, Russia has periodically turned eastward as the Western world displayed indifference or overt hostility toward the Eurasian giant. From the time of Peter the Great, Russians have debated whether their country is part of Europe proper, Asia broadly defined, or a unique blend of the two traditions. With the collapse of communism Moscow made a bid for full acceptance by its European neighbours but soon became disillusioned as NATO expanded toward its borders.

With the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the full-blown invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Vladimir Putin’s brutal violations of international law have solidified Western antipathy toward Moscow and led to Russian isolation. A decade ago, Moscow appeared to be making inroads in the Middle East, but the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad dealt a severe blow to Russia’s position in that region. In the Western Hemisphere, Russia sought to complicate Washington’s calculations by supporting Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. With Nicolas Maduro’s capture by American forces, and the Trump administration’s fuel blockade of Cuba, Moscow is left with few friends in Latin America.

Asian and the Pacific are far more welcoming, which explains Russia’s most recent pivot eastward. The Russia-China partnership has been critical for Moscow. Putin and Xi Jinping have met more than 40 times since Xi became President, and they hold frequent video conferences. The joint statement released just prior to Moscow’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, that theirs was a “no limits” partnership, received widespread attention. China is Russia’s largest trading partner and has been instrumental in helping Moscow evade punishing sanctions imposed by the West. Russia is China’s largest supplier of natural gas, though talks of the Power of Siberia II pipeline have stalled over pricing disputes. Since the start of the Iran war China has significantly increased oil imports from Russia to compensate for losses of crude from the Middle East. Beijing provides over 90 per cent of G-7 sanctioned technologies to Russia, in the form of dual-use, high priority components needed for producing weapons.¹

But China is not the only Asian country aligned with or favourable toward Russia. In June 2026 Russia hosted a summit meeting with ASEAN leaders in Kazan (a city further east, and presumably less vulnerable to Ukrainian drone attacks, than Moscow). As might be expected, the leaders of Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had warm words for Putin. More surprisingly, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos was optimistic about the prospects for hydrocarbon and nuclear energy cooperation, notwithstanding the U.S.-Philippine defence treaty.² Of the ASEAN member-states, only Singapore has imposed sanctions on Russia, though Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, who will host the ASEAN summit in 2027, has pursued a pragmatic diplomatic approach toward Russia.

Moscow’s closest Asian neighbours—the five Central Asian former republics—are wary of Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions. These small states hedge against dominance by any one great power; still, they are dependent on Russia for security and China for trade and investment. The USD 12 billion in contracts signed during Secretary Marco Rubio’s visit to the region in October 2026 signals U.S. interest in competing with China and Russia, though America can hardly challenge China’s economic dominance of the region. In 2025 China’s trade with Central Asia was USD 106 billion compared to a paltry 7.6 billion for the United States. The U.S. leads in foreign direct investment (51 billion compared to USD 44 billion for China and USD 37 billion for Russia), but most of this is concentrated in Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon sector.³ Russia’s influence in Central Asia may be declining compared to China’s, but it is still a major player and leads the United States.

Putin’s Asian strategy has been facilitated by Trump’s foreign policy bullying and incompetence, which have weakened ties with America’s friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific. In August 2026 Trump abruptly cut short annual military exercises with South Korea, claiming they sent a hostile signal to North Korea, a country he inexplicably described as “unthreatening and respectful.” Trump conveniently ignored Pyongyang’s contributions to Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine; Russian-North Korean relations are now the closest they have been since Moscow normalised ties with Seoul in 1990.

India’s strategic value as a balancer to China was highlighted during the first Trump administration, when Defence Secretary Jim Mattis redesignated the military’s Pacific Command (PACOM) as INDOPACOM to emphasise Delhi’s vital role. In Trump’s second term, relations with Prime Minister Narendra Modi have become tense—India increased imports of Russia oil in the face of U.S. sanctions, and the Indian leader angered Trump by refusing to back his claim to having brokered peace following May 2025 clash with Pakistan. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s decision to revert the command’s designation to PACOM in June 2026 further slighted India’s position in U.S. regional strategy.

In short, Trump’s erratic diplomacy toward America’s Asian allies has created new opportunities for Russian advances, beyond Moscow’s partnerships with China, North Korea, and much of Southeast Asia. Moscow has made diplomatic gains in the region since the start of the second Ukrainian war. Russia does not threaten its Asian neighbours (with the possible exception of the Central Asians) and can provide much-needed energy and other raw materials for the region’s dynamic economies. But Russia cannot compete with China in trade and investment; a weak economy has historically been the Achilles heel of Russian foreign policy.⁴ Moscow’s aspirations to be recognised as an influential great power in the Asia Pacific may be unrealistic, but for now the East is far more welcoming than the West.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.