Shifting Tides: The Taliban’s Strategic Outreach to India

The two decades of US-led NATO intervention in Afghanistan came to an end in August 2021. Suddenly, the Taliban seized power in Kabul by establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban’s return to power marked a significant geopolitical shift in South Asia and fundamentally altered the regional political environment. The international community has refrained from formally recognising the Taliban government. At the same time, some of the regional and extra-regional powers have tacitly acknowledged the enduring reality of the Taliban. Accordingly, several countries have sought to engage with the Taliban to further the strategic, security and economic interests in Afghanistan. Among them, Russia became the first major power to formally recognise the Taliban administration, while Pakistan and China—India’s key rivals in South Asia—had already established ties with the Taliban regime.

Against the evolving geopolitical shift, India adopted a cautious approach. Following the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, New Delhi undertook a diplomatic pullout by withdrawing its personnel and suspending the diplomatic mission in Kabul. However, after a year, India’s policy gradually shifted from a non-engagement approach to a pragmatic limited engagement. The ‘pragmatic engagement’ was the outcome of India’s realisation that maintaining the policy of disengagement would gradually erode India’s strategic influence and long-standing presence in Afghanistan, especially as regional and extra-regional powers began to engage with the Taliban government.

Beyond the strategic calculations, India’s ties with Afghanistan have historically reflected the developmental partnership and people-centric approach. Over the past two decades, India has emerged as one of the most significant development partner of Afghanistan through extensive investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and humanitarian assistance. These initiatives have contributed substantially to improving the socio-economic well-being of the Afghan people. In this manner, a complete diplomatic disengagement would jeopardise the positive image and trust that India has built among the people of Afghanistan. Recognising India’s longstanding role in the country, the Taliban administration has repeatedly urged New Delhi to continue its support for both developmental assistance and humanitarian aid. The Taliban’s gradual re-engagement has become increasingly visible through sustained diplomatic interactions with Indian delegates.

Within the last ten months, four Taliban ministers have made official visits to India, reflecting the growing bilateral engagement. The Taliban’s recent ministerial visits to India indicate their interest in engaging and collaborating with New Delhi. For India, allowing such interactions and maintaining a constant dialogue also provides an opportunity to enhance its soft power diplomacy in Afghanistan, where hard power strategies have limitations.

A major milestone in this unfolding re-engagement was the visit of Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to India in October 2025. The visit marked the first formal in-person ministerial-level engagement between India and the Taliban administration since the latter’s return to power in 2021. During his visit, Muttaqi met with India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, and the two sides deliberately addressed the issues relating to regional security and stability, humanitarian cooperation, and bilateral relations. The meeting concluded by reaffirming India’s commitment to supporting Afghanistan in the areas of healthcare, trade and transit, connectivity, and infrastructure development. As an initial step of this commitment, India gifted twenty ambulances. Muttaqi’s visit marked an important milestone toward restoring the India-Afghanistan partnership.

Following Muttaqi’s visit, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Alhaj Nooruddin Azizi, travelled to New Delhi in November 2025. During the visit, Minister Azizi held talks with India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, as well as the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Piyush Goyal. The meetings focused on strengthening bilateral trade, improving regional connectivity, enhancing people-to-people contact and trade facilitation, market access, and capacity-building programmes. The talks reflected both countries’ shared interest in expanding economic cooperation and creating institutional mechanisms to facilitate economic and commercial engagements.

Shortly thereafter in December 2025, the Minister of Public Health, Mawlawi Noor Jalali, was also welcomed by New Delhi. During his meetings with India’s Minister of Health and Family Welfare, J. P. Nadda, both sides discussed long-term cooperation aimed at strengthening Afghanistan’s healthcare system. India reiterated its commitment to supporting Afghanistan through the continued supply of medicines and essential medical equipment. As part of this, India dispatched a substantial shipment of medications, vaccines, and a 128-slice CT scanner to reinforce Afghanistan’s medical infrastructure.

Most recently, from July 7 to July 12, 2026, Afghan Minister for Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, Mawlawi Ataullah Omari, was in New Delhi, where he met with the Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal. The discussions emphasised cooperation in agriculture, irrigation, and rural development while also exploring opportunities for investment, food security, and collaboration in areas of mutual interest. The meeting demonstrated that India-Taliban engagement has gradually expanded beyond humanitarian assistance into broader sectors of economic and technical cooperation.

Therefore, the increasing frequency of such high-level meetings, coupled with long-term development assistance, illustrates New Delhi’s policy of maintaining a constructive engagement with Afghanistan. The high-level diplomatic interactions have facilitated the normalisation of bilateral relations and served the strategic and diplomatic goals of both India and Afghanistan.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.