The Statecraft Institute
Commentary

Space as a Contested Domain: Threats, Militarisation, and the Case for a Space Force

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Introduction

The dependence on space applications makes space a national security priority, and many countries have begun prioritising space as a military domain to protect their vital space assets and investments. The need is increasingly being felt due to the tendencies of revisionist-expansionist states and the rising instability in the world order, which may extend to volatility in space, thereby challenging the existing space environment.

Space remains one of the oldest symbols in all mythological traditions. Before the launch of Sputnik, humans had explored the concept of space wars and the potential for conquering and monopolising it. In 1957, the launch of the USSR’s Sputnik opened a new frontier, marking the beginning of a new military contest.

In contemporary times, access to space has become comparatively cheaper and easier. Space applications are utilised for various activities, including commercial, civilian, and military. As mentioned – “Space is increasingly seen not only from the lens of science and technology, but also from the perspective of national prestige and honour, so defending such a strategic domain becomes vital.” 1

India has a long history of space programmes. The launch of its first satellite, Aryabhata, in 1975 marked the country’s entry into space exploration. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), is widely known for its cost-efficient space missions. India now operates over fifty satellites. While, keeping pace with emerging challenges in 2019 India conducted its Anti-Satellite missile test – Mission Shakti.

Why Space Matters

Decades of exploration of ‘the outside’ have produced many societal benefits. The advanced technologies developed for space missions and the research undertaken have led to improvements in the quality of life on Earth. The growth in scientific and technical knowledge, combined with the development of satellites for studying the space environment, has contributed to the advancement of satellite telecommunications, global positioning, weather forecasting, climate monitoring, and a deeper understanding of the universe and the solar system. These developments were not limited to space but also extended to areas such as energy, recycling, waste management, water purification systems, agriculture, and solar cells. 2 Evidently, ‘there is more space in our lives than we realise.’ 3

In addition to the social benefits, space also creates a new market and has proven to yield a positive return on investment. 4 In the late 1980s, the space sector was opened for commercial and private activities. Space commerce involves utilising space to create value by developing and selling space products, such as satellites and rockets, as well as services like digital communication, online delivery services, financial services, and transport applications. 5 The increasing role of private players in space is poised to play a significant part in shaping space power. Elon Musk’s deployment of Starlink satellites to assist Ukrainian armed forces and to ensure internet connectivity and connection remains a prime example of private and State players coming together and shaping space power. 6

In 2020, New Delhi marked its entry in space economy by opening its space sector to private companies. As of 2026 the India space economy is estimated at USD 8.4 billion, with 399 start-ups active in the sector. It is further projected to grow four to five times over the next ten years, potentially reaching USD 45 billion. 7

Due to its unique potential, space increases the operational capabilities and total effectiveness of the military while fundamentally compressing the time of ‘Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop. It nullifies the geographical limitations of land, sea, and air, while providing a new pathway to intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and data collection. It also offers a global reach with continuous communication that would have been impossible by conventional means. 8 Armed forces worldwide rely on satellite-based navigation systems, such as the Global Positioning System, for precision-guided attacks, coordination, and logistics.

The immense potential of space-based infrastructure for military purposes was first realised in the 1991 Gulf War. Post-war analysis has revealed that satellite systems were utilised at various levels, including aerial imagery for intelligence purposes, reconnaissance satellites to inform military plans, and to determine enemy coordinates. Moreover, geostationary satellites were deployed to intercept Iraqi communications, providing a critical edge to the US and the allied armed forces over the Iraqi army. The Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated the capabilities of space systems and their vital role in military and national security. 9

India has limited satellites for strategic use, and its independent regional navigation system, NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation), is currently not functional. India has ambitious scientific space programs lined up, including the Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme. 10 However, moving forward New Delhi should work towards reviving NavIC and increase budgetary allocation for research and development.

The Threats

Space is a dimension with its own dynamism, providing a plethora of opportunities, knowledge, and services. Due to its riches and benefits, space remains inherently vulnerable to attacks and interference by adversaries. Both the space and space assets remain vulnerable to physical and cyberattacks. Furthermore, most contemporary cutting-edge technology is dependent on space-based assets. If an adversary, state, or non-state actor, can negate the returns of these prized assets, it can render a military blind and fragmented, causing public hardship.

Several counter-space capabilities can be employed to disrupt and deny the space systems, and hinder a nation’s space abilities, ranging from kinetic to non-kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber. 11 Currently, four countries, namely, the United States, Russia, China, and India, have demonstrated direct ascent anti-satellite (hereafter, ASAT) capabilities. 12 However, the missile defence systems can be used as ASAT weapons, and the states with technical ability of orbital launches remain capable of developing such a weapon, 13 so other actors in the international arena may possess such weaponry. Nevertheless, the use of ASAT remains less likely, as it leaves debris as its legacy, which may destroy the country and its allies’ own satellite constellations, leading to massive unintended consequences.

Non-kinetic physical attacks, such as directed energy weapons, are employed to blind the satellite’s sensors. Though effective, this technology is expensive and not widely available. 14 Nonetheless, soft kill techniques like satellite jamming, eavesdropping, hijacking, spoofing, and taking over the control of the satellite, civilian or military are more likely in both conflict and ‘no war, no peace’ settings. 15

Due to its covert nature and difficulty in tracing the cyber perpetrators, it also becomes a great asymmetric strategy of ‘defeating the enemy without fighting.’

International treaties have attempted to regulate the space domain, but they are outdated and increasingly insufficient. For instance, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) required parties to ‘prohibit, prevent, and abstain from carrying out nuclear weapons tests… in outer space,’ 16 a critical step during the Cold War era. While the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the cornerstone of space law, bans the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies, both treaties stay silent on the placement and use of conventional and emerging weapons like directed-energy weapons, cyber tools, etc., paving the way for the militarisation of space. 17 There are no binding international agreements and enforcement mechanisms that prohibit the deployment of these systems in space, or their use against space based systems, nor are there clear definitions about what constitutes a space weapon. Moreover, the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ not to interfere with each other’s space assets is increasingly wearing down, 18 and space is becoming contested more than ever. In this era of strategic competition, it is increasingly evident that space is looked as a ‘warfighting domain.’

Space also contains both the elements of ‘friction,’ i.e., unforeseen, and uncontrollable incidents that may occur during the war and hinder military objectives, and the ‘surprise element,’ i.e., highly secretive military space programs and developments, which make it unclear what threats it may hold.

Space Force

The need for a Space Force arises due to the increasing military utility of space-based assets. From real time ISR, GPS, to early warning systems and global communications, space applications are an inseparable aspect of modern-day military operations. Hence, raising a Space Force, independent or integrated, becomes a strategic necessity. 19

A Space Force would be a dedicated force providing a state actor with a unified single chain of command and a robust cadre of professionals to develop space capabilities and skills and provide advanced training to identify threats, establish deterrence, and formulate space-centric doctrines and strategies. It would result in a structure to take responsibility and accountability in the matters of National Space Security. The force must attain dominance in counterspace operations such as orbital warfare, cyber warfare, and electromagnetic warfare to achieve space superiority and ultimately develop a war-fighting posture to prevent space-enabled attacks against joint forces. 20

For instance, the US Space Force doctrine describes the primary task of the Space Force as “securing national interests in, from, and to space.” The command of Space Force is to act as ‘a bulwark against a space attack,’ 21 while striving for dominance and superiority vis-à-vis the adversaries in the space environment to maintain freedom of operation and accessibility.

Space is a technologically dependent domain with a contested, degraded, operationally limited environment. To counter threat and operate effectively, it will require innovative and revolutionary solutions to ensure advantages. For that matter, considerable effort and resources should be allocated to develop a specialised ‘space research agency’ to research and develop technological capabilities to avert threats to the space-based applications. 22

The importance of a dedicated service is to organise space activities, such as training, surveillance, reconnaissance, data collection, situational awareness, satellite and debris management, developing counterspace capabilities, managing space launch operations, and monitoring ballistic missile launches around the globe, as all of these remains divided among various authorities. A unified structure would be a solution to this problem, proving to be cost-effective as it would reduce duplication of technologies and labour, and result in better coordination and overall effectiveness. Additionally, the satellite operations of the Air Force, Navy, and Army, including space infrastructure procurement and acquisition should be integrated into the Space Force to avoid repetition. Furthermore, to maintain efficiency, essential functions like planning, programming, budgeting, and execution should be transferred to the Space Force. 23 A space control capability would result in Space situational awareness system, defensive and the offensive counterspace operations. Moreover, the Space Force would provide a centralised space management while acting as an indispensable central force in joint military operations against adversaries.

India is a major spacefaring nation having a significant presence in the space through ISRO, and a rapidly expanding private space ecosystem. Moreover, India’s ‘Defence Space Agency’ (DSA) made up of Integrated Defence Staff gives it a militaristic touch. The agency has taken up the former Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre, and the Defence Satellite Control Centre. However, DSA remains an integrated agency of the Indian Armed Forces, rather than an independent force like the United States Space Force.

The Indian Air Force considers space as an inseparable continuum of its domain and hence seeks an extension of its mandate. On the lines of the French Air and Space Force, it aspires to become an Indian Air and Space Force. 24 As space is a capital-intensive sector and India, as a developing country, lacks the fiscal muscle, technology and intent to militarise space; India’s route to a Space Force may be integrated first and dedicated later, if the need arises and the right resources are mobilised.

Conclusion

With the United States announcing that it has deployed “on-orbit space weapons,” 25 the question of space and space based threats becomes more significant in the policy domain. The way forward is to recognise the strategic value of space and start looking ahead to be better prepared to deter any adversarial misadventures. The development of such power requires a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach that includes actors, both state and non-state, to harness the true potential of this dimension and to secure access to space. With the increasing utilisation of space, the contested space environment is only growing, and to protect access to space and defend the global common of space, establishing a Space Force is the right step.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.

References

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  14. ↩
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