The Houthi Conflict and the Stress Test of US-Saudi Relations

The Saudi-Houthi war and US distancing from direct military action have become a stress test for the long-term strategic partnership between Riyadh and Washington. In the wake of the latest escalations in September 2026, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman reached out to President Trump, requesting direct military strikes against the Houthis. Following Washington’s silence, the Kingdom turned to its new allies Turkey and Pakistan for support under the Mecca Agreement. Named after the holy place of Islam, the agreement intends to bring in collective defence and considered “any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all”.

The response from members of the new alliance has been limited – Turkey has limited its involvement in the conflict, as it considers participation as defensive in nature. Pakistan, on the other hand looks fastened in a balancing act—juggling between ‘expressing solidarity’ and ‘standing shoulder-to-shoulder’ to defend Saudi territory, yet distancing from committing its forces into active combat.

On the question of America’s role, Washington has refrained from direct participation in the conflict, but it has been instrumental in establishing a new joint forces command that includes approximately 200 US military advisors – actively working along with Saudi officials to disseminate timely intelligence and geospatial targeting information to counter Houthi attacks.

For now, the US distancing from direct involvement should not be looked as a change in American security guarantees; rather, it is influenced by the pressure over its offensive and defensive systems – targeted against the Iran conflict. Given the geographical expanse of Saudi Arabia, it is near impossible for both Riyadh and Washington to secure the vast network of the Kingdom’s critical infrastructure by deploying large-scale air defence systems; even if deployed, these defences are at risk of being overpowered by the low-cost offensive missiles by the Houthis.

For now, Washington’s focus is on speeding up to replenish its stocks of ammunition that may be required in case there is a third round of escalation. war

Historically, the US military assistance to Saudi Arabia against the Houthis reflects a recurring pattern of diplomatic distancing – balanced with periodic cooperation between both sides. During the 1950s and 60s, in the border and regional disputes involving Riyadh, Washington restrained from active involvement and largely remained neutral.

In the recent period, the US has targeted Houthis on a number of occasions. Beginning in the aftermath of the October 7 Israeli strikes on Gaza, the Houthis began large-scale attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. In response, the US and UK, along with partners launched Operation Poseidon Archer. This first phase of the conflict lasted almost a year, from January 2024 to January 2025, with significant breaks in-between, and just months before the start of the 12-day war, a second phase of strikes was launched under Operation Rough Rider. It was a brief conflict spanning 52 days between March and May 2025, and with the Omani-backed negotiations, Washington and the Houthis agreed to end the hostilities.

In the wake of the 12-day conflict in June 2025, Saudi Arabia declined the US permission to use its airspace and military bases for attacking Iranian targets. Taking a step down from its position, the Kingdom in the February 2026 US-Israel Operation Epic Fury permitted the US military to use Prince Sultan Air Base for launching strikes on Tehran. So far, the US-Saudi relationship has followed a realist approach, as neither Riyadh nor Washington shares a defence treaty obligation, thus limiting the security relationship transactional. This dynamics is likely to continue in some form or another amid the changing US security priorities in the region.

Amid the latest rounds of conflict along the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, representatives of the Houthis and US held a meeting at the US Embassy in Oman. During the talks, the Houthis reaffirmed their commitment to the May 2026 ceasefire with Washington. When asked about the US position, President Trump stated, “they called us, and they don’t want to fight us and the group was allowing ships to pass – thus it will work out very well”. Such a response highlights the view that for now the US is in no mood to divert its attention from Tehran.

While the US-Iran front has been relatively quiet for some time, given the distrust and differences over the terms of the peace agreement, the conflict could escalate in the coming days. Even after the shock of midterm results, for now, in the Middle Eastern theatre, Trump is focused on ensuring an outcome that is anything – but not a perceived defeat. Given the failure of the regime change strategy, now the most visible strategy for Trump is limited to securing a respectful deal or exit. Until then, Washington will like to keep its focus limited to Tehran.

Even as the US distances itself from active involvement and the activation of the Mecca Agreement, Saudi Arabia is working closely with US security experts, maintaining continued US involvement. Riyadh recognises that Washington remains a vital regional actor which it simply cannot afford to ignore.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.