The Palestinian Authority as Qatar’s Gaza Bypass
- Author
- Published on
Summary
Qatar has continued to show support for the Palestinian Authority over recent years, even while maintaining close ties with Hamas. These moves have played out through diplomatic meetings, public statements, humanitarian partnerships, and an emphasis on Palestinian unity, all while keeping the PA relevant as a key player on the scene.
In early September 2025, Qatar highlighted meetings between its prime minister and Hussein al-Sheikh, Deputy Chairman of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The move was meant to signal that the possibility of PA involvement remains relevant in Doha’s eyes, even against the backdrop of the war in Gaza. Just days later, mid-month, a Qatari news outlet shared a video showing Hamas leaders—and reportedly al-Sheikh as well—offering condolences over a Qatari casualty killed in an Israeli strike in Doha.
In 2025, Qatar kept up its role as a key player on multiple fronts. It held meetings with PA officials regarding Gaza alongside pushing projects like Al-Fakhoora and investing in school and university education. These steps show that even if Hamas is disarmed, Doha’s influence will not take a hit, since its connections with the PA remain solid. That same month, the ambassador of the “State of Palestine” to Qatar announced a land bridge established to Gaza and general support for Palestine.
By early November 2025, Qatar’s official position became even clearer. While the PA is presented as a legitimate actor, reality on the ground shows that Hamas keeps its weapons. A few days later, Qatar’s Minister of State for International Cooperation held a Zoom call from her office with the Palestinian “Operations Room” regarding aid deliveries to Gaza. Photos from the call clearly showed the PA emblem.
Speaking to journalist Tucker Carlson in December 2025 at the Doha Forum, the prime minister called for inclusive engagement, including with “non-state actors such as the Palestinian group Hamas,” as the only viable route to regional peace.
Several major moves took place that month. A day before a multinational force gathered in Doha, the Qatari prime minister hosted Mahmoud Abbas’s deputy to discuss Gaza and setting up a Palestinian state. Toward the end of the month, it became clear that Qatar had been working on this process since the height of the war through meetings with PA representatives. The list of members for Gaza's new governing council—approved by Hamas and the PA, led by Egypt, and involving the White House—reflects Qatari involvement. The new body, set to function as a Palestinian unity government, will answer to international oversight, but the message is clear: Qatar sees the PA as a central partner in shaping Gaza’s future.
By July 2026, expressions of support continued. Mahmoud Abbas offered condolences to the Emir the death of his father. This step served as another example that Qatar is not tied exclusively to Hamas, but to the PA as well, with the unifying factor between them being their stance toward Israel. By the end of the month, the dynamics along the Hamas-PA axis were noted alongside Qatari sensitivity to international criticism, minimal as it might be.
Throughout this period, a consistent trend stands out: Qatar is not satisfied with supporting Hamas alone. It holds high-level meetings with senior PA officials, collaborates on humanitarian aid, highlights official PA symbols, and promotes a vision where the PA plays a central role in Gaza while integrating elements from Hamas. Investments in education, diplomatic coordination, and public statements paint a picture of ongoing support that lets Qatar keep broad influence in the Palestinian arena. These steps are happening alongside international developments, such as talks on multinational forces and ceasefires, pointing to a long-term strategy that seeks to balance different actors while keeping Doha in place as a key mediator.
A Likely Scenario
A fairly likely scenario pushed by Qatar is the PA taking charge in Gaza in a way that seemingly positions Qatar as advancing Trump’s plans for Gaza's development. At the same time, Qatar would push Hamas into PA mechanisms to enable a later takeover once international attention on Gaza fades. That way, Qatar stays the main channel of communication. Under this same scenario, Qatar is building further setups—like bringing FIFA into the Gaza vision—in a way that lets Hamas figures blend into the future governance structures emerging in the Gaza Strip.
Qatar’s support for the PA is not just talk; it is backed by concrete actions: hosting senior officials, coordinating aid, advancing educational projects, and stressing unity. Even when messages surface about unity with Hamas or armed groups keeping their weapons, room is saved for the PA as a legitimate actor. This lets Qatar present itself as a backer of Palestinians as a whole while managing complex ties with both main sides. The chronological overview shows that this support is not a one-time thing, but an ongoing effort adapted to international attitudes toward Hamas.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.

