Restraint in Beijing, Risk on the Frontiers
- Author
EditorialThe Statecraft Institute
- Published on
The fifth plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was held in Beijing between 26 and 29 October 2026. Fifth plenums have been known to discuss the upcoming five-year plan, but this had already happened during the fourth plenum, where the recommendations regarding the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) were made in October 2025. The plenum therefore looked inwards, adopting resolutions on the perseverance of the full and rigorous Party self-governance. The plenum decided upon the confirmation of a new expulsion process, promoted Zhang Shengmin to the Politburo, and set the 21st Congress of the Party for the latter part of 2027. In all, recent analyses indicate that the plenum was primarily about ensuring that the Party is prepared for the leadership transition of 2027. The implication of the same extends to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as to neighbouring nations like India.
Plenum ratified the exclusion of 33, with 16 of them being military officers. Some of those who faced expulsion were former Politburo member Ma Xingrui, former Central Military Commission (CMC) vice-chairman Zhang Youxia, former Joint Staff Department Chief Liu Zhenli, and former International Department Chief Liu Jianchao. Ten alternate members have been elevated to make up for those vacancies in full membership. None of them were from the military. The resolution puts into words Xi Jinping’s longstanding commitment to discipline. The priorities include increasing the quality of cadres and their Party spirit, strengthening centralised leadership of the Central Committee, increasing self-regulation of Party institutions and making the fight against corruption ongoing and institutionalised.
This means that cadres will be examined more rigorously. Not only must officials be examined for how they cope with challenging tasks, but also how they relate to their friends, family and assets. The business activities of officials’ spouses and children would be under review as well. Local “top leaders” have been told not to consider their regions as their personal property and to abide by collective decision-making. Private businesses, internet companies and technology enterprises are supposed to strengthen their Party organisations. In addition, the digital discipline inspection system, introduced in February 2026, would be further developed, with special attention paid to cryptocurrency and capital flowing overseas. Xi Jinping has raised the ideological issues related to the increasing proportion of post-reform period-born members, which is a major concern prior to 2027, when there will be a large-scale turnover of generations.
Such an extensive drive cannot be justified on the basis of factional politics alone. It is based on increasingly standardised processes of “rule by law” rather than “rule of law”, and it has to some extent the backing of elites and the masses. The Party’s open self-criticism itself gives it strength, and Beijing makes use of the weaknesses of other democracies to bolster its international reputation. At the same time, it is a measure of control, ensuring compliance with central guidelines and sifting out loyalists by 2027. It has its price tag too. Bureaucrats afraid of sanctions will await guidelines and bury themselves in paperwork, thus avoiding experiments that the resolution warns against.
It is the military that has been affected the most. The CMC has been reduced to two members from its seven-member strength in 2022, with Xi and Zhang Shengmin, a discipline official and political commissar without any operational experience, taking the lead. Of the 44 full members of the military elected in 2022, 25 have been confirmed as expelled, representing a great loss of their number. Three consecutive directors of the General Office of the CMC, Xi’s control hub in the army, have all been dismissed. Admiral Qin Shengxiang has been under investigation since February 2026, with Generals Zhong Shaojun and Fang Yongxiang being expelled at this plenum.
Three out of five theatre commands are without a permanent commander. Six generals and 18 lieutenant generals attended the Long March ceremony held in October 2026, compared to 38 and 120 in similar events held in 2013-2014. These numbers reveal a paradox where loyalty is now viewed as a liability. For example, those who are loyal to President Xi like his childhood friend Zhang Youxia and Zhong Shaojun, have been sacked as possible rivals. There is no mention of any new members in the CMC since there might not be many eligible generals left.
Routine activities persist – patrols, operations, exercises, and acquisition are not impacted. However, there are different incentives. Junior officers, fearing that they may be perceived as weak and politically apathetic, might consider grey zone pressure against China’s periphery to be a risk-free method of displaying their loyalty. In addition, with the weakened high command and newly appointed officials, the conduct of more complicated multi-domain operations or even a conflict becomes risky in the short term.
Wang Haijiang’s expulsion as the former head of the Western Theatre Command, the one responsible for the Line of Actual Control (LAC), means that the purge has reached the command that matters for India. It does not necessarily mean anything about any change in boundary stance and any reduction in pressure from China. What matters would be who gets to assume position in this command after that, with Wen Junfei, the deputy commander of the Western Command, being an observer at the plenum. From India’s strategic perspective, this suggests continued grey-zone activities on the LAC and at sea, limited interest in major operations until 2027, when a new army emerges from the restructuring and preparation for a stronger and more disciplined Chinese army in the coming period. There is a narrative aspect as well, since China’s discipline campaign is a narrative aimed at Third World audiences.
There was no successor appointed in the plenum and a fourth term for Xi in 2027 is widely anticipated. The fundamental contradiction in the plenum is left unresolved, namely the need for discipline among the Party and military on one hand, and fear-induced discipline on the other hand.
