The Suez Crisis at 70: The Mid-Terms Prove it is “No End of a Lesson” in Iran
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With the 70th anniversary of Anglo-French-Israeli military action against Egypt, the lessons of 1956 echo in 2026’s Iran war for another vital waterway to global trade. After the mid-terms, American actions proves that “no end of a lesson” continues to be taught 70 years on.
Military lessons
In 1956, Prime Minister Anthony Eden lamented the lack of deployable military might to counter Egyptian President Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Britain needed lengthy planning for operations as neither the Parachute Brigade nor the Royal Marines were immediately available. Shipping, too, was unavailable to build a taskforce, meaning Britain struggled for many months to wield military force. Even when aerial bombardment did begin, it took days before a landing force could sail to Egypt.
In 2026, even the US Navy has come under close scrutiny, with America’s struggles to maintain the operational deployment of three carrier battle groups revealing the limits of power projection available to President Trump. This has been further compounded by the redeployment of long-range aircraft across Europe.
For Britain in 2026, the image of Type 45 destroyer HMS Dragon stuck in dock will live long in the political memory, both Britain and its allies. 2026 has shown that allied nations lack the capacity to respond to crises. HMS Dragon serves as a stark reminder not only of the Royal Navy’s immediate lack of ships, but more broadly of Britain’s current condition of being “strategically unavailable” in any crisis.
Political lessons
Acting without the support of allies is present in Iran as well as 1956. In 2026, the US found itself dependent on allies to permit the use of bases for long-range strategic aircraft, then flummoxed when it was not immediately forthcoming, particularly with staging B-1 Lancer bombers at RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire. Waging an expeditionary war of choice, America has been shown to carry deep dependencies on allied goodwill. There was a clear lack of consultation with allies to ensure permissions ahead of operations beginning. In 1956, Britain assumed the acquiescence of the US, believing President Eisenhower would not oppose military action. This was a grave miscalculation on the part of Eden, leaving Britain dangerously exposed to the economic effects of a crisis upon one of the most important waterways to global trade. With global political outcry across the media to the bombardment of Alexandria in October and the subsequent ground invasion in November, Britain carried a unique level of risk to the global markets not shared by their French and Israeli partners.
When Pound Sterling came under pressure, Eisenhower applied it as leverage by not propping up the currency, catalysing a run on the sale of Sterling-denominated debt that began to devalue the Pound. Britain never failed militarily at Suez, it was defeated by an ally who disagreed with their policy, using an asymmetric economic lever to force a cessation to hostilities. In 2026, America has certainly suffered no military defeat, but it has suffered economically.
While there is a notional end to hostilities in the Straits of Hormuz, the global markets have been unkind to the US. The conflict has thrown global energy supplies and prices into a level of uncertainty that Suez never reached, with long-term implications unclear. From the price of oil to the availability of fertiliser for agriculture, inflation on the Dollar, jet fuel costing almost double its pre-war rates, and higher gasoline costs to Americans domestically are just a few of the consequences.
In 1956, the Suez Crisis impacted the week of the presidential election, leaving Eisenhower far less able to indulge British interests. In 2026, the Iran War undoubtedly shaped the pivotal mid-term elections for the Trump Administration, who lost both Houses to the Democrats. Vice-President J.D. Vance said it bluntly: “The reason we lost is the war.”
When it comes to the use of force, political decision-makers must bear in mind both the sensitivities of their allies and the economic vulnerabilities that the nation will be exposed to during any hostilities. In 1956, Britain found itself “strategically vulnerable” on an economic front. America, meanwhile, found itself in 2026 “politically vulnerable” going into its mid-terms, now facing a new domestic political reality as a result.
Conclusion
With the 70th anniversary of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion to invade Egypt, this embarrassing and shaming moment in history shows not only that lessons have endured, but they offer continued wisdom about the use of force. Retaining capability – military, political, and economic – for a crisis is a must. Now, even America finds itself stretched in sustaining overseas military operations, and is learning these same lessons. The most valuable lessons remain political. One must be sure of the state of mind amongst one’s allies, and to recognise the exposures to global economics that can have long-standing impact not only to the national economy, but to the direction of the electorate. At age 70, the Suez Crisis remains “no end of a lesson” indeed, as America’s mid-terms have proven.
Acknowledgement : This article is sourced from an earlier publication by the author, “The Suez Crisis at 70: Its Renewed Relevance in 2026”, published by The RUSI Journal.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.

