Trust, Tension and Transition: Redefining India-Bangladesh Relations

India-Bangladesh relations have been South Asia’s rarest success story for over five decades. Both the countries have been through a golden era built on cooperation in the field of security, connectivity and trade. The relations turned cold with the student movement in Dhaka, forcing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina flee to India. The 2024 protests marked the greatest setback in the bilateral ties ever since. What followed was a turbulent period presided over by an interim regime under the leadership of Nobel laureate Mohammad Yunus. The interim government’s tenurewas characterised by pronounced anti India sentiments, attacks on minorities, classified outreach to Islamabad, criticism of India for sheltering Hasina which further degraded the Delhi-Dhaka bonhomie.

The February 2026 election was the first democratic exercise after the fall of the Awami League, which welcomed Tarique Rahman as the new prime minister. There will be concerns as to the approach the new power dispensation takes, but one cannot deny that there will be challenges going to go back to the strategic comfort of the past. Indian representatives including Lok Sabha speaker Om Birla and foreign secretary Vikram Misri were in Dhaka for the swearing in ceremony of Rahman. Breaking away from traditions, India appointed Dinesh Trivedi, a former railway minister with roots in Bengal as the High Commissioner to Dhaka. He has been granted cabinet rank status to highlight the significant political handholding for recaliberating the relations. The resumption of visas has been the strongest confidence building measures. On the foreign policy front, Prime Minister Rehman choose Malaysia as the first overseas destination – maybe a signal for a renewed foreign policy beyond the spheres of India and China. From New Delhi’s perspective the emphasis is to ensure it remains “Bangladesh’s preferred partner” on aspects of both security and connectivity.

Similarly on the concern of siding with India and Pakistan, Bangladesh is sloganeering “Na Dilli, Na Pindi, Sobaraage Bangladesh” meaning neither Delhi nor Pindi (Rawalpindi), first comes Bangladesh. This is where Rahman’s “Bangladesh first” doctrine comes into play. The same approach has been taken up by Khalilur Rahman, foreign minister of Bangladesh when he positions Dhaka as a sovereignty first actor, centred around commitment to independence, sovereignty, national interest and welfare of Bangladeshi people.

These postures reiterate that Dhaka’s strategy is to reject tilting decisively towards any of the major powers in South Asia, and that it is proactively looking for a redefinition of Bangladesh’s foreign policy

The primary concern for New Delhi is the political resurgence of the Jamat-e-Islami, concentrated along the pockets of India-Bangladesh border facing the states of Assam and West Bengal. Given the fact that Jammat-e-Islami does not form the chunk of the political landscape in Dhaka at present there are more possibilities of India-Bangladesh convergence than it was during the Yunus era.

Amidst these simultaneous developments, India’s outlook towards Bangladesh needs recalibration. New Delhi’s Bangladesh policy has always revolved around the memory of 1971: the idea of India as a liberator and Bangladesh as a grateful partner. Today, Dhaka’s youth is driven by global trends and economic aspirations than historical memories alone. For New Delhi the way out from this lies in understanding that influence and trust in Dhaka will have to be earned back through measurable efforts in trade, connectivity, water sharing, visas and investments rather than continuously invoking memories of the past. Lingering to the liberator narrative raises the risks of Bangladeshi public and politics viewing India through paternalistic neighbour and a regional hegemon.

What prevails currently is neither a full strategic comfort that prevailed in the Hasina era nor turmoil that characterised Yunus era. It is something more venturesome, a relationship which can be rejuvenated through sustained dialogues, resumption of visas, visits of envoys, protocol honours. Meanwhile both the sides assess how much genuine is the warmth that exists below their diplomatic setup. A Modi-Rahman summit in the near future, deeper talks on connectivity, cooperation, security and how Dhaka manages the minority protection issue and border security will be central to the reset and what it holds for both the countries in the next chapter.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.