The Statecraft Institute
Commentary

Pakistan in the Middle East Chessboard

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For a long time Pakistan has tried to act as a bridge between South Asia and the Middle East. It is linked to the region as a non-Arab, Muslim nation with nuclear weapons – that has in the past committed its security services to a number of regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. In all this Pakistan has limited itself to training, advising, and providing technical support to the defence forces of these member countries.

The recent crisis in the Middle East was triggered by the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas. Since then the US, along with Israel, launched a series of missiles against Iran – beginning with the 12-day war in June 2025 and continuing to the most recent on February 28, 2026 under ‘Operation Epic Fury’, killing Iran’s Supreme Leader and several key officials. As the conflict continues between the US and Iran, the Houthis – a non-state actor in Yemen – have opened a new front against Saudi Arabia, attacking the Kingdom’s airports and oil infrastructures.

Amid this turbulence, Pakistan has managed to secure a seat over the Middle East chessboard. Where on the one hand it is mediating between the US and Iran for a peace deal, and on the other hand, promising military support to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Agreement. This marathon between shuttle diplomacy and hard power projection makes Pakistan’s role more complicated.

Since the end of the Second World War, the US-led Western powers have acted as security guarantors for the Middle Eastern friends in one or the other form. While expanding its grip over the crude, the West made every effort to contain the communist influence in the region. Throughout the Cold War period, the US and its allies were involved in various coups and military intervention – notably in Iraq, Syria and Iran.

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the US-led NATO launched ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban but soon shifted to ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003 and invaded Iraq, ending the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi turmoil only expanded to other countries in the region, and by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, half of the Middle Eastern countries were engulfed in the wave of Arab Spring – demanding greater accountability, democracy, political freedom, and social justice. Meanwhile, the US and its allies were successful in engineering regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen—at least on paper.

Given the potential threat of domestic instability, Pakistan adopted a neutral non-interventionist approach to the 2011 Arab Spring movement. Today, one and a half decades later, the Middle East is once again in conflict. This time Tehran’s escalation strategy has directly targeted U.S. military bases, as well as regional nations hosting American facilities.

Within a week of the initial strikes, Pakistan stepped into the conflict as a formal mediator. Despite disagreements, Pakistan was successful in securing a two-week ceasefire on April 8. Following the ceasefire, Islamabad successfully brokered the highest-level engagement between the US and Iran since 1979 at the Islamabad Talks on April 9–10, 2026. Building on the success of these talks, a 14-point MoU was signed between Tehran and Washington on 16 June 2026. However, the continued distrust has derailed the peace negotiations, and efforts are being undertaken since then.

Because of growing tensions, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) in August 2025. Taking a step further, Turkey joined Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in a trilateral defence agreement in August 2026, called the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA). Drawn on the lines of NATO’s Article 5 commitments, the agreement by large knit together Saudi finance and capital, Turkish defence capabilities, and Pakistan’s military and nuclear posture.

Why Peace Matters for Pakistan

The Middle East holds crucial importance for Pakistan, especially in terms of remittances and energy imports.

The Gulf region is home to a 4.9 million Pakistani diaspora that contributes close to 10 per cent of Pakistan’s GDP in terms of remittances. In the fiscal year 2025, the region accounted for close to $38.3 billion in remittances. If the conflict continues for long, it will affect the labour market that may result in reverse migration wherein labourers will be forced to leave the region. Pakistan, which already is facing economic hardship at home, the return of diaspora labourers will only add to that pressure.

Similarly, Pakistan is also dependent on the region for its energy needs. For instance, crude oil constitutes 30 per cent of the country’s total energy mix, with approximately 80 per cent of these supplies coming from the region. Additionally, liquefied natural gas (LNG) accounts for 20 per cent of the total energy supply, with imports accounting for 15 per cent from here. With rising militarisation of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab these supplies are further interrupted. The disruption in supply has increased Pakistan’s import cost. For instance, in the month of April 2026, Pakistan’s monthly oil bill surged to USD 800 million from a pre-war baseline of USD 300 million—marking a sharp increase of 167 per cent. This additional cost has only further increased Pakistan’s exchequer and revenue losses.

Geographically, the Pakistan-Iran land border stretched over 900 kilometres. In case the US-Iran peace process collapses and the Saudi-Houthi conflict escalates, Islamabad will not be comfortable in any scenario. Increased instability inside Iran risks a surge in illegal migration and cross-border terrorism. Even in the case of the Saudi-Houthi conflict, Iran remains heavily interested in continuing its assistance to the Houthis. In such a scenario, Pakistan risks a possible diplomatic and security rift with Iran, and the resulting fallout may come at some unease along the border.

Thus, the Middle East chessboard will not be easy, given its domestic security concerns and commitments under the Mecca agreement. Islamabad is torn between choices – wherein, on one hand, Pakistan under the defence agreement is committed to the participation of its armed forces in supporting the Saudi-led war against the Houthis. On the other hand, Islamabad continues to present itself as the torchbearer of peace negotiations between Iran and the United States.

For Pakistan, the Middle East is a barbed-wire necessity: if left undisturbed, it serves Islamabad’s economic and energy security, and any further disruption threatens to unleash severe bloodshed.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.