Rethinking Conflict Resolution in the Era of International Intra-State Armed Conflicts

I have argued in my chapter titled “How Do We Approach the Russo-Ukrainian War as an “International Intra-State Armed Conflict”?, published in The Impacts of the Russo-Ukrainian War Theoretical and Practical Explorations of Policy Agendas for Peace in Ukraine (Springer Nature Singapore, 2025) that the theory and practice of conflict resolution developed over the past decades require re-examination in light of numerous armed conflicts with high casualties, many of which are prolonged or reignited. Current approaches have serious shortcomings in analysing policies designed to alleviate or prevent armed conflicts. Identifying major flaws in the analysis and approaches of conflict resolution is crucial for addressing these challenges.

Despite this reality, theories of conflict resolution have heavily relied on the myth that contemporary armed conflicts are solely intra-state. While focusing on the intra-state nature of contemporary armed conflicts is useful and indispensable, it fails to capture all essential aspects, as many conflicts also possess international dimensions. Given the high number of armed conflicts and the ineffectiveness of international responses, it is necessary to critically reexamine the assumptions underlying conflict resolution theories. This re-examination is crucial to ensure that theoretical insights align with the complex and evolving nature of armed conflicts in the twenty-first century.

This strict disciplinary division hampers the development of conflict analysis from multiple dimensions. Both International Relations and Conflict Resolution offer unique approaches that could enhance multidimensional conflict analysis. However, the strict disciplinary division prevents the effective integration of these approaches in coherent ways. Studies of international affairs and armed conflicts operate in isolation, often underestimating the impact of changes in international order on armed conflicts and neglecting the influence of intra-state armed conflicts on the course of international order.

The problem of strictly demarcating between international and intra-state armed conflicts results in an inability to recognise the phenomenon of armed conflicts flexibly and realistically. Excluding international elements from intra-state armed conflicts leads to the oversight of their extraterritorial dimensions. The biased assumption that an intra-state conflict is geographically and politically confined within one territorial sovereign state becomes an obstacle in analysing its complex multidimensional nature.

To overcome this obstacle and the associated perception biases in recognising armed conflicts, it is essential to reconsider the disciplinary boundary between International Relations and Conflict Resolution. These two disciplines should stimulate each other by sharing analytical concepts and theories. For example, the concept of “deterrence”, which is deeply rooted in International Relations with a focus on nuclear deterrence and superpower confrontation, is rarely introduced in Conflict Resolution, particularly in the context of disciplinary discussions about the role of international peacekeepers or intervention forces. However, because many armed conflicts have both international and intra-state elements, it is crucial to overcome these disciplinary barriers and perception biases to achieve a more comprehensive understanding.

The intermingling of intra-state armed conflict and international war in Ukraine is not exceptional, as seen in other cases like Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and other countries. These circumstances underscore the urgent need to remove the disciplinary constraint of demarcating between “intra-state conflict” and “international war”. Instead, there is a strong need to integrate insights from Conflict Resolution and International Relations to better understand and analyse the reality of “international intra-state wars”.

The limitations of academic perspectives in Conflict Resolution and International Relations, particularly the relative lack of integrated theories to analyse “international intra-state armed conflicts,” may mirror the challenges faced in implementing conflict resolution measures in practice.

As discussed earlier, the problematic presupposition underlying policy assumptions becomes evident with the increasing number of armed conflicts, giving rise to the phenomenon of “international intra-state armed conflicts.” Contrary to the general observation emerging in the 1990s that armed conflicts primarily result from state fragility and poor governance, the widespread occurrence of international intra-state armed conflicts challenges the assumption that intra-state factors are the major causes of such conflicts.

The era of ambitious agendas for peacebuilding and state-building has passed. Few donors can afford to sustain large investments for extensive projects aimed at renewing sovereign states. UN peacekeeping operations continue to see downsizing in their budgets, personnel, size, and operational scope. Even humanitarian aid activities began to be downsized in 2023. Given this challenging reality, conflict resolution policies must be adjusted realistically to align with the conditions on the ground.

Firstly, the traditional measure of “deterrence” should be discussed in conflict resolution, responding to many international intra-state armed conflicts in the contemporary world. With the weakening and loosening of US power after the rapid expansion of NATO, partner states are urged to increase their defense efforts. In line with this process, (sub-)regional organisations such as the EU, AU, and ECOWAS have emerged as security providers. While they have clear limits in their operational capacities, they are expected to function as deterrence mechanisms by compensating for the lack of strong military alliances to deter instability in their regions. This applies to countries like Ukraine, which aspires to accede to NATO but may not be able to do so in the near future. There must be some kind of deterrence system to prevent the spread and re-occurrence of armed conflicts once they are alleviated or terminated. The package of so-called “security guarantees” is supposed to be a deterrence system through weapon provisions, capacity development, information sharing, and other measures.

Secondly, the traditional measure of “monitoring” should be reassessed in the context of the downsizing of peacekeeping operations and the reluctance to conduct military interventions as “enforcement” actions. Methods of UN peacekeeping operations are becoming outdated. The pretence of a universal organisation may continue to be undermined by the Security Council, as it fails to decide on important policy agendas due to serious confrontations among the permanent members. The effectiveness of economic sanctions is being seriously questioned. In the end, elaborate manners of mediation for peace through negotiation must be patiently respected, with careful introductions of ad-hoc monitoring mechanisms and the way they operate in gradation of areas. In short, more modest approaches to conflict resolution need to be revalued, with reinforced investments in the areas of mediation and monitoring. In the case of large countries such as Ukraine, universal nationwide implementation of monitoring is practically impossible. Therefore, there should be ad-hoc mechanisms of monitoring in gradation systems, which could classify the national territory into different areas.

Thirdly, the recent approach to peacebuilding, particularly regarding ambitious reform agendas, needs to be scaled back. The diminishing credibility of liberal democracy negatively affects the way peacebuilding agendas are pursued. With reduced funding for peacebuilding projects, it is crucial to prioritise conflict resolution efforts. The Hobbesian concentration of power in the central government may not work effectively under circumstances where universal values are seriously questioned. More gradual, nuanced, and locally-owned approaches to peacebuilding need to be mainstreamed. In addition, regional settings beyond national borders are indispensable. In the case of Ukraine, which is becoming a strong military power in the region, assurances of confidence-building measures with neighbouring countries must be pursued through an informal platform for dialogue among regional partners. Multi-layered conflict management systems with multiple partners would be necessary.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Statecraft Institute.